Abstract: This study explores how minority status influences individual decisions about investment in a post-conflict society. The study is based on multiple sources of evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, we exploit an exogenous imposition of minority and majority positions by an asif random adjustment of an administrative boundary and analyze household and business surveys. Second, we run a "lab-in-the field" experiment. The analysis shows that both actual and experimentally induced minority statuses are associated with lower levels of investment. Evidence suggests the perception of discrimination by the government, and not actual discrimination, as the plausible cause of such behavior. Several implications follow: emergence and persistence of segregated ethnic businesses, underinvestment and a basis for horizontal inter-group inequality that could increase the probability of a conflict.
Introduction
This study explores the effect of belonging to an ethnic minority group on individual decisions to invest in a post-conflict society. Recent literature on the link between ethnicity and economic outcomes has mostly sought to explain variation in levels of public goods provision (Easterly and Levine 1997; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Montanalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Habyarimana et. al. 2007 Habyarimana et. al. , 2009 Esteban et al. 2011; 2012) . This is an important, but only partial outcome of the economic behavior. Little attention has been given to explaining variations in savings and investment patterns, which economists consider crucial to economic growth (Acemoglu 2008; Banerjee and Duflo 2005) . Our research aims to fill this gap and thus contribute to the studies of the phenomena that lay both on the right and the lefthand sides of the equation of interest, namely investment and ethnicity.
In the standard political economy literature, investment is modeled as a function of credit constraints, market competition, security of property rights, risk preferences and time horizon (see the review in Dixit and Pindyck 1994). These studies do not explicitly consider social and political factors of investment, which include networks, trust and other-regarding preferences, even though these factors play a crucial role in shaping investment decisions in the developing world (Banerjee and Duflo 2005 , De Mel et al. 2008 , Breza et al. 2013 . One important exception is a study by Voors et al. (2012) who explored the role of ethnic conflict on saving and investment decisions.
They found that exposure to violence leads to more altruistic behavior and increases risk seeking. However, their scope is limited to the effects of extreme shocks rather than more fundamental persistent factors of economic behavior. We argue that ethnic identity is one such factor.
The meaning and interpretation of ethnic identity has been contested (see Chandra 2004 , Laitin 1998 , Fearon and Laitin 2000 . Some scholars argue that ethnic identity cannot be used as an independent variable since ethnic identities are social constructs and therefore are endogenous factors. Yet, following van Evera (2001), we argue that ethnic identities can be taken as independent variables particularly in the case of post-conflict societies where such identities are highly salient and stable. In such contexts, ethnic identities can be considered exogenous variables, minimizing potential problems stemming from reverse causality.
Our contribution to understanding ethnicity begins with our departure from a common approach in the literature, which focuses on the effect of membership in a particular ethnic group (Habyarimana et al. 2007; Chandra 2012) . We instead investigate the dynamic between majority and minority identities, a powerful division in many multi-ethnic societies. In doing so, we also diverge from studies on ethnic politics that both theoretically and empirically compare ethnic groups solely on the basis of ethnic differences rather than also considering the groups' differences in terms of size, social status, wealth, and political power. In divided societies, these characteristics are especially pronounced between ethnic majorities and minorities.
History is replete with stories of successful entrepreneurs who were ethnic minorities in their host countries (Fafchamps 2000) . Maghribi traders, Jewish merchants in Medieval Europe, and Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia are among the most colorful cases (Greif 1993; Stow 1994; Chirot and Reid 1997; Jesudason 1989) . However, anecdotal evidence also reveals many stories of disadvantaged minorities group with Blacks in the US as the most obvious reference (Myrdal 1944; Becker 1957; Light 1972) . Between-group inequality has profound effect on political and economic development, but studying its causes is a very difficult task. The fundamental problem is that minorities are unlike majorities in many unobservable ways. Identities are deeply embedded in societies, and group positions are contextual and path dependent. Therefore, isolating the effect of ethnic identities is hard, but is also a very important endeavor for better understanding economic and political development.
The first attempt to study the implications of this dimension of ethnic identity was done by Gurr (1995) with Minorities at Risk Project. More recent studies based on the new dataset on Ethnic Power Relations find relative group positions, especially in access to political power, as strong predictors of civil wars, coups and economic growth (Wimmer et al. 2009; Cederman et. al 2010) . However, these studies look only at the outcomes of the group positions on the aggregate (usually national) level and do not explore the individual effects. In contrast, we follow the strategy of social psychology literature that systematically explores the ethnic minority-majority asymmetry in beliefs, attitudes and behavior (Staerkle et al. 2010) .
We hypothesize that identification with an ethnic minority leads to preferences for consumption instead of investment either due to the lack of trust in government institutions, which are controlled by "another" ethnic group or due to negative interethnic attitudes.
We test our ideas with evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH) -one of the classical examples of divided societies. 4 First we look at the large-N survey data collected in BiH from 2000 to 2010 by the UNDP. The data indicate that there is a negative correlation between minority status and expectations to save money, which is the necessary precondition for investment. 5 This evidence gives tentative support to our logic, but one can hardly make any causal inferences from these data because majority and minority positions are confounded by many important contextual factors, such as well being or education.
To isolate the role of minority status we rely on naturally occurring and experimentally induced exogenous variations in the ethnic group status. The natural experiment we exploit is the result of the as-if random imposition of the Inter-Entity Results gathered from the analysis of the different sources of evidence showed that ethnic identity indeed has a profound effect on economic behavior. Surveys revealed that minorities are less likely to save and invest and that minority businessmen are less likely to expand their businesses. Both household and business surveys indicated that the main driver of this behavior is lack of trust in governmental institutions, but not a distrust of the majority ethnic group. Results from the lab-in-the field experiment validate these findings: individuals have no difference in investment behavior playing with co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics, except under the condition when an ethnically biased institution puts them in the minority position.
Hypotheses
As it was proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) , we incorporate ethnic identity in the utility function to model economic behavior of people in divided societies. 7 We assume that a person's expected returns from investment is the function of the objective economic indicators of the household, including capital and credit constraints; personal preferences towards investment and consumption, including risk preferences; and identity, which in our study is a dichotomous variable that distinguishes between belonging to a majority ethnic group and being a member of a minority group.
Our main hypothesis states, that ceteris paribus:
H(1) minorities are less likely to invest in economic assets than majorities;
The mechanisms that link minority ethnic identity and underinvestment in productive activity are hypothesized to be in the dimension of trust. Trust is an important factor of economic behavior because it affects individuals' time-horizon, risk preferences and ultimate sense that their investments are secure, as well as a 6 Both surveys and experiment were implemented in January of 2013.
willingness to cooperate with other potential investors and government (Greif 1993) .
We distinguish between in-group and out-group trust and trust in governmental institutions. We formulate two competing hypotheses: 
Identification strategy
We test our ideas with multiple sources of evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) -a classic example of divided societies. 8 The site selection was driven not only by substantial interest, but also by important methodological reasons.
The effect of belonging to a minority ethnic group on investment behavior is difficult to estimate with observational data due to the omitted variables problem and selfselection. Indeed, belonging to an ethnic group, as well as states' and communities' ethnic compositions, are not assigned randomly and are associated with many important characteristics that might or might not be observed by a researcher.
We argue that the political history of BiH presents an opportunity to partially solve this problem by studying the exogenous imposition of majority and minority statuses in a situation that can be considered a natural experiment. 11 The war led to the displacement of over a million people among whom an estimated 110,000 people remained internally displaced by 2013.
12 Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Accords outlined principles for the potential reversal of the demographic consequences of the conflict. Paragraph one of article one declared: "All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them."
The data of more than 66,000 observations contain several indicators important to our study. First and foremost, the data explicitly identify majority/minority status of the respondents. This variable indicates whether an ethnic group to which a respondent belongs is in the numerical majority on the municipal level. We use it as an independent variable. As the main outcome variable we use the measure that comes from the question as to whether the household plans to save money in the next year. Savings are the necessary preconditions for investment and therefore preferences for savings would tell us about the potential for investment.
As we noted in the introduction, analysis indicates that there is a negative correlation between minority status and expectations to save money. The relationship holds after we control for entity, ethnicity, employment status 13 , education, gender, age, settlement type (i.e., rural or urban) and time effects.
However, as we also stated before, minority status can be confounded by the unobservable characteristics. To isolate the effect of minority status we restrict the data to the municipalities adjacent to the IEBL and run all models again. Analysis of the restricted data with plausibly exogenous minority status also produces negative relationship between minority status and expectations on savings (see Figure * and Table 1 in the Appendix A).
Because municipalities are relatively large units, majorities and minorities even in this geographically restricted data are different on many observable characteristics. 13 We use employment as a measure for income, since income measure is unreliable
In order to provide stronger and more conservative identification we conduct an additional original household survey, which specifically addressed the questions about investment preferences.
To minimize the difference between two groups we surveyed respondents in locations closest to each other on both sides of the IELB in two particular municipalities -Sanski Most and Prijedor, where adjustment of the administrative divisions after the war was especially intense. 14 During the course of the war these territories were under Serbian control, but in the very end of the war, Bosniak forces took Sanski Most under their control (see the change in the frontline in Figure 1 in Appendix B). During the Dayton conference the fate of these two municipalitieswhether they would belong to RS or FBiH -was a highly contested issue and the location of the borderline was uncertain (Belloni 2005). We build our sample for an original household survey in close proximity to this fragment of the boundary line.
See map of the research site in the Figure 2 in Appendix B.
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The survey relied on a sample (N=350) blocked by majority/minority statuses and the ethnicity of the respondents. 16 Balance tests on the observables between minority and majority groups in our sample are presented in Table 1 in Appendix B in Supporting Information.
The survey contains 72 questions on a household's economy, respondents' attitudes towards different ethnic groups, their political preferences, war experience and basic demographic information. The main explanatory variable of our studybelonging to a minority versus majority ethnic group --is embedded in the design.
Relying on the highlighted empirical strategy we test the effect of nearly random imposition of minority statuses on the outcomes of interest. The main dependent variable of the study is the preference for investment over consumption. We measured this with a set of hypothetical questions about respondents' behavior if he 14 The survey was conducted in Sanski Most, Prijedor, Koprivna, Lusci Polanka, Donja Puharska, Podlug and Kozarac situated along one segment of IEBL both in Federation of BiH and RS. See map of the locations in the Figure 3 in Supporting Information. 15 The map was drawn with the data from Nils B. Weidmann, "Replication data for: Violence "from above" or "from below"? The Role of Ethnicity in Bosnia's Civil War", http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/16335 V1 We are thankful to Nils Weidemann for making the data available. 16 The sample was not random, since we do not have reliable information on the general population. The response rates were about 80% for majorities and about 60% for minorities. In our sample we have only Serbs and Bosniaks and excluded Croats.
or she were given $500, $2,000, $5,000 and $10,000: consume or invest. Figure 1 depictures the means for all four outcomes.
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The analysis shows that belonging to a minority ethnic group is a strong predictor of respondents' preference for consumption over investment for the sums of $500 and $2.000. Moreover, ethnic identity has the highest predictive power in the models that include basic socio-demographic and economic variables. To check for robustness of the effect we use the matching technique (Ho et al. 2007) , which aims to minimize the difference between groups in the most important observable characteristics, including gender, age, education, nationality, employment status, income, time of residence and exposure to violence (see Table 2b in the Appendix B) 18 . Analysis of the matched data confirmed the results gained from baseline estimation: minorities are more likely to spend the hypothetical sum of money of $500, $2.000 and $10.000.
To test the two hypotheses of the lack of interethnic and institutional trust as the main determinants of underinvestment in productive activity, we estimate the effect of 17 Results of the estimation of the full models of the predictors of investment decisions are presented in Table 2 in the Appendix B in Supporting Information.
18 Most importantly, matching highlights that minorities and majorities do not differ in terms of time of residence -most of them were born in the locations where they are currently living, that partially mitigates the concern of sorting. Tables 3 and 3b in the Appendix B). 
Business Survey
We next explore the link between belonging to a minority and underinvestment among people who are actually involved in entrepreneurship and for whom questions about investment are not just hypothetical. In order to do this, we conduct an additional detailed business survey. Our sample consists of 64 entrepreneurs (Bosniaks) lived in the town of Prijedor 19 before the war, some of whom returned after the war to the town, which became part of RS, and some stayed in FBiH.
20 Table 1 in Appendix C shows that the two groups of respondents are balanced on the key observable characteristics.
The main outcome measures of the survey were the record of their credit history and their plans to take on additional credit in the future. We found a clear pattern of underinvestment among minorities: controlling for the income level and other relevant predictors, Bosniak businessmen in RS, where they are the minority, are less likely to have taken credit in the past and are less likely to take on credit to expand their business in the future (see Figure 3 and Table 2 in the Appendix C).
In the interviews with entrepreneurs, none of the minority respondents acknowledged any actual cases of ethnic discrimination by the authorities against 19 Respondents for this survey were recruited through the procedure of snowball sampling. All respondents were asked the questions from the standard household survey plus specific questions on their business. 20 On 30 April 1992, after Serb forces took control over Prijedor , thousands of non-Serb civilians were confined in concentration camps. Source: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The game was played online on a Z-Tree interface in specially organized computer laboratories in two locations -Sanski Most, FBiH with a predominantly Bosniak population and Koprivna, RS with a predominantly Serbian population.
23
Thus we only have majorities as the subject of the experiment. The sample of subjects consisted of 240 people, recruited randomly on the streets.
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The basic setup of the game is as follows: a player A is given an initial Our experimental manipulation is based on the random assignment of the groups of subjects to three conditions. 28 Players who were assigned to the control group played the standard version of the investment game. Two "sanctioning" treatments introduced a third-party player who was said to be able to punish other players for "non-fair" behavior (Charness et al., 2008) . The two treatments differed 23 Before the war both places were belonging to one municipality, but after the imposition of the IEBL one of them remained in the municipality Sanski Most and another became a part of Ostra Luka. 24 Agreement to participate was very high (more than 90%). We attribute this to the monetary incentives -all subjects received a show-up payment that equals 3KM, which is equivalent to the average hourly salary in the region. 25 The players were given points that were later changed for the local currency KM at a fixed rate. 26 Participants do not know the exact number of rounds they are going to play. 27 All names were pre-tested by native speakers, to ensure their ethnic identifiability. The first names were not used to avoid gender-bias. Here we follow the experimental protocols from Alexander and Christia (2011) . 28 Random assignment of the groups to the treatments was provided via a computer algorithm.
only in third party identity. In the neutral treatment, the enforcer was anonymous, and in the biased-third party treatment, an enforcer's fictional name had an obvious cue to ethnicity 29 . In fact, the "third party" had no discretionary power -under both conditions it invariably punished the players if they sent or returned less than 40% of the amount. Nevertheless, in the mixed setting the introduction of the ethnically biased enforcer allows us to induce the majority/minority statuses, because under this treatment one of the players faces not only a counterpart from a different ethnicity, but also an enforcer from the same opposite ethnicity and therefore the game can be seen by the player as 1 against 2, with the first player in minority and the second in majority. In this setting under the biased enforcer treatment with a cue to Serbian name, Bosniaks become the minority and Serbs the majority. This can be considered as a hard test for our hypotheses, since in real life all players are ethnic majorities in their respective entities, and only the experimental manipulation puts them into a minority position.
In the context of the game we expect the players randomly assigned to the minority position, i.e. play with non-co-ethnics under non-co-ethnic supervision, to invest at the medium rate that will be considered "fair", but not to reach the optimal investment level due to the fear that the discriminatory behavior of their counterparty won't be punished by his or her co-ethnic. As a result we expect "minorities" to invest less than the people, who were assigned to be supervised by the neutral enforcer. The outline of the experiment is depictured in Table 2 . 
Analysis
Usually analysis of the average treatment effects in behavioral games is based on a difference-in-means estimation or regression of the outcomes of the treatment.
However, for identifying the treatment effects in sequential games and repeated games, which we are using for our experiment, such approach might lead to bias (see Green and Tusicisny n.d. for a comprehensive critique).
Establishing the treatment effects in the sequential game is a challenging task, because the second mover (player B) is in fact presented with two treatments, an assigned treatment, introduced by a researcher, and the amount that the first mover sends, which a researcher could not control. This situation violates the excludability assumption because the treatment effect of interest is confounded by the amount that the first player contributes. Therefore, in order to recover the true ATE for the behavior of the second player we use the fully saturated models that include the constant, an indicator for the treatment (which in our case affects both the first and second mover because the assignment of treatment was provided on the group level), the indicator of the amount sent by the first player and all possible interactions between them.
We focus our analysis on the percentages of sent amounts of money in the first round of the game, which are the clearest outcomes of the experimental treatments.
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For these outcomes we estimate the saturated models. Then we turn to the analysis of the other three rounds of the game that is based on simple OLS regressions adjusted for covariates 31 . Finally, since the randomization was provided on the group level we use clustered robust standard errors. Results of the estimation of the full models are presented in Appendix E.
To establish the effect of the induced minority and majority statuses we estimate the difference-in-means between the amounts of money sent and returned under two third-party treatment groups in the mixed setting. Results of the analysis shows that 30 We use percentages rather than amounts of money sent and returned as the main outcome variables because it is easier to interpret them. 31 The fully saturated model in this case would include the constant, an indicator for the treatment, the amount of send and return in all the previous rounds and all interactions between them. Estimation of such model is associated with an extremely high number of degrees of freedom and is impossible with the size of our sample.
the inducement of minority status produces an approximately 6.5 percentage point decrease in money sent in the first round. (Results are presented in Table 3 ). Results of the test of the main hypotheses for all four rounds with adjustment to covariates show that the pattern holds: minorities send from 6 to 10 percentage points less than subjects who just played with non-co-ethnics with the unbiased enforcer (Table 5 in the Appendix E).
The impact of minority identity is especially striking if we compare it to the average treatment effects for the full sample. Except in the settings that introduce minority and majority positions, the ethnically biased enforcer has no statistically significant influence on players' behavior. In contrast, the neutral enforcer has a consistent positive effect that is especially pronounced for the ethnically mixed groups where the treatment causes an increase in 5 percentage points for sending money (significant at 10% level) and almost 20 percentage points increase in returning money (significant at 5% level). See Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix E.
For the descriptive purposes we also compare the means of the main outcomes for ethnically homogenous and mixed groups. Surprisingly, we find that playing with co-ethnics is associated with lower percentage of money sent (-11.5; p<0.01 for the full sample and also negative, though insignificant for Bosniak players; see Table 8 in the Appendix E) in the first round and is not related to the percentage of money returned in the first round. In other words, we do not observe co-ethnicity bias; moreover regarding trust we see positive discrimination of the out-group.
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Discussion
The analysis of the multiple sources of data has established a strong relationship between ethnic minority status and underinvestment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The large-N survey conducted by the UNDP indicated that there is a negative correlation between minority status and expectations to save. The analysis of the restricted data from the ethnically mixed areas divided by the exogenously imposed boundary, provides evidence that this relationship might be causal. Additional original survey around the same boundary showed that people who hold a minority status tend to prefer consumption to investment, perceiving the business environment as hostile and distrusting authorities. Interviews with the businessmen, half of whom returned after the war to their hometown, which had become part of the Serbian entity, and therefore turned to be minorities, and half of whom stayed in the Bosniak-majority entity, gives us additional insights into the link between ethnic identity and economic behavior.
We found that despite the absence of any actual discrimination against them, minorities tend to perceive the business environment as discriminatory. The attitudes are accompanied by actual reported behavior: minorities took on less credit for the expansion of their business and were also less likely to plan to take on credit in the future. As a result, minorities' businesses only provide subsistence for their households. Further, we found that distrust in the government, but not out-group hostility (in our case anti-Serbian sentiment), is a plausible mechanism that linked ethnic identity to economic behavior. The lab-in-the-field experiment confirmed the results of our observational studies. Most importantly, we found that even artificially 32 Since our research focuses on the effect of belonging to a minority rather than the effect of playing with co-ethnics, we do not randomize which players assign to what condition. Therefore, we do not pretend to give any causal interpretation of the co-ethnicity factor, but rather assess the effects of our treatments for both ethnically homogenous and mixed conditions. induced minority identity leads to a decrease in the amount of money transfers, which are understood as a measure of trust. Because there was no difference in third-party behavior between neutral and biased treatment, we argue that main driver of distrust and underinvestment is the perceived discrimination or alienation from the state. This These studies among others show the importance of studying minority-majority divides, and our study is the first one that isolates the causal effect of minority status on economic behavior and political attitudes.
Conclusion
Using the mixed methods approach that combined the household surveys, business survey and the novel lab-in-the-field experiment, our study found that in the post-conflict setting, minority ethnic identity undermines investment and this effect is driven primarily by the perceptions of discrimination and alienation from the state.
Although the study was conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina -in many ways a unique country --we believe that the implications of it will be useful for understanding of the link between politics and economic development across other divided and post-conflict countries.
The broad implications of our findings include undermining growth due to underinvestment, persistence of ethnic businesses and horizontal inequality. 
APPENDIX A. Analysis of the UNDP Household Survey
APPENDIX C. ANALYSIS OF THE BUSINESS SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
Welcome. Thank you for coming today. My name is ***. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Your participation in this study is voluntary. As you know you will receive a payment of 3KM today for your participation. You also have the opportunity to receive up to 20 KM based on the tasks involved in today's activity.
Please understand that we will be providing all money and at no time will we ask you for money so do not worry. Now, let me tell you a little about this research project. This is an international scientific research project, and the questions that you will answer and the tasks you will perform have been asked of people all over the world. The purpose of the project is to understand how people of different cultures, and backgrounds make decisions, interact with other people, and how their decisions are affected by the conditions where they live. We are going to ask you to make decisions about money. These decisions will involve not only you but also other people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In this project, I will serve not only as the administrator of this session, but also as your local contact, in case you ever have questions about the progress of the study or your involvement. Standing over there is my assistant. He/she will pass out the forms and materials that you will use.
You will participate in two main types of tasks today. You will receive different forms for each task. In one task, you will be asked to make several decisions about how to allocate money. In each of these tasks, you will have to decide how to allocate a sum of money between yourself and someone else or a group of people. These other people will not be in this room, but they will be future participants in this study, and they will all be from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The other task will be to complete a survey, which asks questions from general international social surveys on public opinion, attitudes, and basic social data. Rest assured that we will not ask you to provide any information that could be used to identify you as a participant in this study.
Before we begin there are several rules we would like you to keep in mind:
First, you should not talk with one another or look at anyone else's work.
Second, please listen to all instructions that I give you. This is very important. If you follow the instructions carefully you might make a considerable sum of money.
Third, we will be handing out many different forms to you. Please do not begin filling out or looking at those forms until I ask you to do so.
Finally, you just received a card with an ID number on it. Please turn it upside down. Do not show that number to anyone else except myself or one of my assistants.
Do you have any questions? If not, let's begin!
Instructions group 1
Before each task you (person A) will receive 3 points in your account and need to decide how much of this money you want to send to your counterpart B (you could send from nothing to the whole amount-from 0 points to 3 points). Each amount sent will be multiplied 4 times by the time it reaches him/her (if you send 2 points, your counterpart would receive 8 points). After that, he/she decides how much of that money to keep and how much to return to you (he/she could also return you from nothing to the whole amount). So here your earning depends not only on your decision, but also on you counterpart's decision. The money that you did not send and the money that you receive will be added to your account.
Example: You are keeping 1 point and sending 2 points to person B. He is receiving 8 points and sending you back, for example, 4 points. So, in your account you would have 1+4= 5 points.
At the same time in another task you are paired with a different person B. In this task, the roles are reversed, which means person B will also send you money from his/her account, which will be multiplied 4 times, and you will have to decide how much to return, and how much to keep (you could return from nothing, to the whole sum).
Example: Person B decided to send you 1 point from his/her account and you received 4 points. After that you decided to send back 1 point. Your profit is going to be 3 points.
It is important to emphasize that you could send nothing to your counterpart in both tasks and leave all the money to yourself, if you think that by doing that you are going to profit the most.
All this money (that you did not send from your account, that you received back from the person you sent money to, and the money that you decided to keep that someone sends you) will be added up on your account.
Example: In the first part of the task (when you are sending money) you earned 5 points and in the second part (when you received money) 3 points; so in sum, at the end of the task you would have 8 points on your account
In the next part of the task, you again receive 3 points in your account and play the same task, but with a different counterpart (in every task you are working with a different person).
All the money that you receive will be added to your account.
Example: money that you receive in the second part of the task will be added to the 8 points that you had in your account from the first part of the task.
Instructions group 2 Rules:
Before each task you (person A) will receive 3 points in your account and need to decide how much of this money you want to send to your counterpart B (you could send from nothing to the whole amount-from 0 to 3 points). Each point sent will be multiplied 4 times by the time it reaches him/her (if you send 2 points, your counterpart would receive 8 points). After that, he/she decides how much of that money to keep and how much to return to you. But while making you decision, you should take into account that there will be an unbiased Third party (he/she will not know any of your personal information other than a number assigned to you ) who will be monitoring your transaction and will be able to punish you or your counterpart if he/she thinks that the transaction is not fair.
So here your earning depends not only on your decision, but also on you counterpart's decision, and the actions of the third party who could intervene if he/she thinks that transaction is unfair.
The money that you did not send and the money that you receive will be added to your account. At the same time in another task the roles are reversed and you are acting as person B, which means-someone also will send you money from his/her account, that would be multiplied by 4, and you will have to decide how much of it to return and how much to keep. Here also, the third party is present to monitor the fairness of the transaction.
Example: Person C decided to send you 1 point from his/her account, which is multiplied by 4and so you received 4 points. After that you decided to send back 1 point. The third party considers transaction fair. This means you will get 3 points and person C is getting 2+1=3 points.
Example 2: Person C decided to send you 2 points from his/her account, which is multiplied by 4 and so you received 8 points. After that you decided to send back 1 point. The third party considers this transaction unfair and punishes you by taking 3 points from your account. And as a result at the end of the task, instead of earning 7 points, you would only get 4 points and Person C will get 1(that he kept and did not send you)+1+3=5 points.
Consider another example where in the first part of the task (when you are sending money) you get 5 points and in the second part (when you received money) 3 points; so in total, at the end of the task you would have 8 points in your account
In the next task, you again receive 3 points in your account from a different counterpart (every task you are paired with a different person), but with the same third party.
(Repeat Instructions as necessary using different examples)
Instructions group 3
Before each task you (person A) will receive 3 points in your account and need to decide how much of this money you want to send to your counterpart B (you could send from nothing to the whole amount-from 0 to 3 points). Each point sent will be multiplied 4 times by the time it reaches him/her (if you send 2 points, your counterpart would receive 8 points). After that, he/she decides how much of that money to keep and how much to return to you. But while making you decision, you should take into account that there will be a Third party (Mr. Dusanic) who will be monitoring your transaction and will be able to punish you or your counterpart if he/she thinks that the transaction is not fair.
So here your earning depends not only on your decision, but also on you counterpart's decision, and the actions of Mr. Dusanic who could intervene if he/she thinks that transaction is unfair.
The money that you did not send and the money that you receive will be added to your account. Dusanic decides that transaction is unfair and punishes you by taking 1 point from your account and giving it to your counterpart. So by the end of the task you have just 2 points in your account and person B has 1 point.
At the same time in another task the roles are reversed and you are acting as person B, which means-someone also will send you money from his/her account, that would be multiplied by 4, and you will have to decide how much of it to return and how much to keep. Here also, Mr. Dusanic is present to monitor the fairness of the transaction.
Example: money that you receive in the second part of the task will be added to the 8 points that you had in your account from the first part of the task. Below there are print screens of the game that illustrate the process of the game. 
Points exchange table
SURVEY TASK
Now we would like you to answer a few questions about your background and opinions on a wide range of issues. The assistant will come around to each of you and hand you a survey booklet. The first thing you will need to do is to copy the ID number on the card you were given on the front of the survey booklet. Do not open the booklet until I instruct you to do so. We will go through each question together as a group. I will read each question aloud and you will circle the appropriate answer.
Please do not read ahead. Answer only the question that I am reading to you, and be patient if others take more time. If you have questions, please raise your hand, and I will come to you. Please do not say your answers to questions aloud, because it will influence what others think. And you may all disagree about the answers to some of the questions. When everyone is finished, the assistant will collect the survey booklets and we will call you one at a time to receive your payment for participating in this project.
CONCLUSION
This concludes our study. I want to thank everyone for your participation. The tasks that you engaged in here are valuable for our research. You are now free to leave.
Please leave all materials here including all pens and paper. We thank you for participating in our study, and please feel free to contact us in the future if you have any questions. Our contact information is provided on your invitation letter and consent form. However, please feel free to stay if you have any further questions.
Thank you again and have a good day. 
APPENDIX E. ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIMENT AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
